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Paula Nagler∗
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Abstract
The introduction of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) in Chile in
October 2002 led to more comprehensive unemployment protection while decreasing
the opportunity cost of job change. Using a difference-in-differences approach
this paper examines whether the introduction of UISA had an impact on the
differences in subsequent wages and contract types of (i) workers changing into
a new employment, and (ii) workers experiencing a period of unemployment before
re-entering the labour market. The analysis uses longitudinal social protection
data and is the first to empirically investigate the effect of UISA on subsequent
employment quality. The findings suggest that the introduction of the UISA scheme
had a small negative effect on the wage difference of formal private sector workers,
but no effect on contract types. Using informal private sector workers as a control
group, only workers of the treatment group experiencing a period of unemployment
show statistically different and positive results in wage growth. The robustness
analysis, using an alternative “as if” introductory date and a different control group,
largely supports these findings. The paper therefore concludes that the effect of
UISA affiliation on wage growth is slightly negative, but positive compared to a
control group for workers experiencing a period of unemployment, leading to a
marginally higher employment quality for this latter group.
JEL classifications: C21, C31, E24, J64, J65, J68, O54
Keywords: Chile, Contract Type, Employment Quality,
Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts, Wages
∗UNU-MERIT/ Maastricht Graduate School of Governance, Maastricht University and Maastricht
School of Management, Maastricht, The Netherlands, Contact: paula.nagler@maastrichtuniversity.nl
1 Introduction
Chile introduced a new unemployment protection scheme for formal private sector
workers in October 2002. Before, unemployment protection was limited to severance
pay in case of job termination due to economic necessities of the firm, complemented
by low unemployment insurance (UI) benefits. The new law introduced individual
unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISA) in addition to severance pay and
abolished the low unemployment insurance. Access to accumulated savings was extended
to workers losing employment due to just cause or voluntarily leaving the current
employment.1 Furthermore opportunity costs of workers were reduced in case of job
change, as accumulated benefits are kept in the individual savings account. Employers
can similarly benefit from the new policy introduction by reduced ad-hoc obligations in
case of severance payments.
Due to the extension in unemployment protection and the reduction in opportunity costs,
this paper examines if the policy introduction had an effect on the subsequent employment
quality of two groups of workers who leave their initial employment by analysing the
differences in wages and contract types. The first group changes directly into a new job,
the second group retakes a job after experiencing a period of unemployment.2 Workers
who terminate their initial employment relation face reduced opportunity costs in case
of a job change, or increased financial leeway to search for a better job in case of
unemployment, if they are affiliated to UISA. To my knowledge this paper is the first
to empirically investigate if the Chilean UISA scheme had an impact on subsequent
employment characteristics, measured by the differences in wages and contract types
between the initial and subsequent employment relation, and by a difference-in-differences
analysis using a control group. Different to unemployment insurance schemes, where
numerous studies have analysed the impact on subsequent employment characteristics,
this scheme presents an alternative kind of unemployment protection. It is not based on
risk-pooling as in an insurance type of scheme, but presents a forced savings scheme that
is financed by both the employer and the employee in case of permanent contracts, or
by the employer only in case of temporary contracts, and entails a solidarity fund as a
minor component that is accessible when certain conditions are fulfilled.
I use longitudinal data from the Chilean Social Protection Survey and expect the following
results. First, workers who directly change into a new employment relation and who
are affiliated to UISA have reduced opportunity costs, as accumulated savings remain
in the worker’s individual unemployment account, although they still lose their right
to severance pay. I expect that workers are more willing to change employment for
other (better) work opportunities, even if wages of the new employment are not higher,3
1 Just cause includes: expiration of contract or misconduct.
2 In the remainder of the paper I use the expressions “post-employment” and “post-unemployment” for
these two groups. Post-employment refers to workers who directly start a new job after terminating
their initial work relation, and post-employment wages (contract types) refer to wages earned (or
contract types signed) in this subsequent job. Post-unemployment refers to workers who terminate
their initial work relation, experience a period of unemployment, and then re-enter the labour market.
Post-unemployment wages (contract types) refer to wages earned (or contract types signed) in this
subsequent job, after experiencing a period of unemployment.
3 “Better” work opportunities could entail a wide range of more preferable characteristics to the employee
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since they forgo less unemployment protection loss when changing jobs. With regard
to contract types I expect that workers with a permanent contract only change to a
new employment if receiving the same contract type, while workers with a temporary
contract are willing to accept an employment with the same (temporary) or permanent
contract type.4 However, workers affiliated to UISA might put less emphasis to permanent
contracts due to extended unemployment protection. These expected outcomes are
not substantially different compared to a situation without the UISA scheme, but the
willingness to change for a new employment is higher due to reduced opportunity costs
and could therefore have an impact on the differences in wages and contract types.5
Second, workers who are unemployed before re-entering the labour market and who are
affiliated to UISA, face reduced pressure to find a new employment. Therefore they
have more time to find a job that offers adequate payment and contract type. This is
expected to have a positive impact on the wage difference, compared to a situation without
unemployment protection. I also expect the impact on the following contract type to be
similar or superior, as workers can spend more time to search for a permanent contract.
However, the outcome also depends on whether the worker experiences a short- or medium
length of unemployment, or if the worker is a long-term unemployed. During long-
term unemployment skills decline, with a negative effect on the subsequent employment
characteristics.
Using a difference-in-differences approach, I find significant and negative effects on the
wage difference between workers who started before or after the UISA introduction,
but no effect on the difference in contract types for workers of both groups. Using
informal private sector workers as a control group, only the wage difference for the post-
unemployment group is statistically different and positive for the treatment group, while
the overall effect continues to be negative. I therefore conclude that UISA had a small
negative effect on the wage difference, with a magnitude of 5 to 7 percent less compared
to workers who are not affiliated, but had no effect on contract types. In comparison with
the control group, the difference in wage growth is statistically significant and slightly
positive. The subsequent employment quality is therefore only partially affected (wages),
and as expected: the wage difference is overall negative for UISA affiliates compared to
workers not affiliated, but the difference in wage growth is positive when compared to
the control group.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical
literature of the impact of unemployment protection on subsequent employment quality,
followed by a description of the UISA scheme in section 3. Section 4 describes the
database used and provides descriptive statistics. Section 5 explains the method used for
the analysis and section 6 presents and discusses the results. The final section concludes
with a summary of the findings, policy recommendations and suggestions for further
research.
that exclude a higher wage, for example more adequate job requirements for the worker’s qualifications,
distance to travel to the work location, or opportunities to develop within the company, among others.
4 I make the assumption that workers consider a permanent contract superior to a temporary contract.
5 See also Nagler (2013) on the impact of UISA accounts on employment duration.
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2 Literature Review
The literature on unemployment protection suggests that unemployment benefits lead
to ambiguous labour market outcomes. First, they improve the overall labour market
efficiency, as risk-averse workers would seek low-risk, but also lower-paid employment,
leading to an equilibrium with low unemployment, but also lower capital and labour
ratios, and a worse job quality. Unemployment protection therefore encourages workers
to seek higher-paid and higher-quality jobs that also include higher unemployment risk
(Acemoglu and Shimer, 1999). The composition of the labour market changes, and
consequently total output and welfare increase (Acemoglu and Shimer, 2000). Second,
it shields households from a sharp fall in income during unemployment by providing
unemployed workers a financial cushion while searching for reemployment. And third, it
leads to longer unemployment duration and overall higher unemployment as shown by a
large body of literature, among others van Ours and Vodopivec (2008), Tatsiramos (2009)
and Caliendo et al. (2013).6 Longer unemployment duration arises due to two reasons.
Unemployed workers can be more selective with regard to incoming job offers compared
to a situation where they would have to accept the first employment irrespective of wage
and quality, and due to lower search effort (Katz and Meyer, 1990; Acemoglu and Shimer,
2000).
While unemployment benefits lead to prolonged unemployment duration, as workers
can be more selective when searching for a job, they might simultaneously lead to
favourable outcomes in terms of subsequent job quality. In standard job search theory,
unemployment benefits have been interpreted as a search subsidy, allowing job seekers to
spend more time searching for adequate jobs that match their abilities and satisfy certain
conditions. The potentially favourable outcomes are based on Burdett (1979) who argues
that job seekers searching for employment do not have perfect information about all
job positions that are currently available. Therefore, they need time to search for new
positions that match their qualifications and offer adequate conditions. Consequently
generous unemployment protection is expected to increase the job match quality for the
subsequent employment, for example through better employment stability and higher
wages. Positive outcomes are expected to apply primarily to short- and medium-term
unemployed workers, but to a more limited extent to long-term unemployed workers due
to a decline in skills and other negative effects of long unemployment spells.
Unemployment protection can assume various forms and designs, depending on a
country’s context and preferences, for instance unemployment insurance based on
risk-pooling, severance pay or individualised savings accounts. Most studies that
evaluated unemployment protection have focused on unemployment insurance due to
its prevalence in advanced economies. Severance pay, in particular, is widespread in
developing countries, which is often restrictive and can lead to a situation of rigid
labour markets (Vodopivec, 2013). Unemployment accounts are a relatively new design
of unemployment protection and have gained increased attention over the past decade,
although they have already been implemented in the 1970s and 1980s in various Latin
American countries alongside unemployment insurance, or for specific subgroups of
6 Other empirical studies include Card and Levine (2000), Lalive and Zweimu¨ller (2004) and
Addison and Portugal (2008).
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workers (Ferrer and Riddell, 2011). Unemployment accounts are not only discussed as a
form of unemployment protection to replace restrictive severance pay, but to also improve
the efficiency of unemployment insurance schemes in advanced economies due to problems
of moral hazard.
In the literature the theoretical and empirical effects of unemployment protection
on subsequent employment quality have been analysed in their large majority for
unemployment insurance schemes. For unemployment accounts a number of theoretical
studies have been conducted to analyse the expected outcomes if unemployment insurance
was replaced by individualised savings schemes, among others Orszag and Snower (2002),
Brunner and Colarelli (2004), Feldstein and Altman (2007) and Brown et al. (2008).
Orszag and Snower (2002) argue that unemployed workers who receive benefits from
unemployment accounts internalise the social costs of their unemployment to a greater
extent compared to unemployment insurance and have a higher incentive to actively
search for employment. Unemployment accounts are therefore expected to lead to higher
employment, lower unemployment and higher productivity. Brunner and Colarelli (2004)
point out that unemployment accounts give the unemployed more financial security
compared to unemployment insurance, and furthermore allows them to take the time to
retrain and to find employment if necessary. Feldstein and Altman (2007) also argue that
it would facilitate a substantial improvement in the incentives of unemployed workers.
Brown et al. (2008) analyse the incentive effects of unemployment accounts and simulate
a model using data from high-unemployment countries in Europe, and find that they
change people’s incentives and could achieve significant reductions in the unemployment
level without reducing the overall benefit level for the unemployed.
The studies compare primarily the theoretical model to unemployment insurance schemes,
but do not take the effect on subsequent unemployment quality into account. However,
if the theoretical argumentation of the papers also holds in practice, both better and
worse outcomes for subsequent employment quality can be expected. Better outcomes
due to a higher effort to find employment, financial leeway to retrain and higher labour
productivity, while keeping the unemployment protection at a similar level compared to
unemployment insurance schemes. Worse outcomes due to a higher pressure to find quick
reemployment before depleting the individual account, even if the new job does not offer
adequate conditions. The outcome is also expected to depend largely on the design of the
scheme, for example on the generosity of benefits or on additional governmental support.
Empirical evidence of the impact of unemployment benefits on subsequent job
characteristics only exists for unemployment insurance schemes and results have so far
been mixed. Most research has been conducted using data from the United States,
Canada and, more recently, European countries. Positive effects, defined as higher wages,
employment stability and better access to permanent contracts, are found by Gangl (2002)
and Tatsiramos (2009), weak positive effects by Belzil (2001) and Centeno and Novo
(2009), and positive effects for certain subgroups of workers by Ehrenberg and Oaxaca
(1976) and Caliendo et al. (2013). Wulfgramm and Fervers (2013) equally find positive
effects, but include and study labour market support programmes. Card et al. (2007),
Lalive (2007), van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) and Schmieder et al. (2010) do not find
significant outcomes.
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A number of studies establish positive, weak positive or partly positive effects with regard
to subsequent employment stability and wages. Gangl (2002) studies unemployment
duration and post-unemployment wages using US and German data. In the United
States the negative effect on unemployment duration slightly outweighs the wage
increase, while in Germany the positive effect on post-unemployment wages is more
pronounced. Stronger UI effects are furthermore found in the lower tails of the wage
distribution. Using data from the European Community Household Panel Tatsiramos
(2009) provides evidence for increased duration of subsequent employment, suggesting a
positive matching effect of unemployment benefits. Belzil (2001) finds a weak matching
effect between benefit duration and subsequent job duration using Canadian labour force
data. Increasing the maximum benefit duration by one week increases unemployment
duration by 1 to 1.5 days, but increases the expected subsequent job duration by 0.5
to 0.8 days only. Centeno and Novo (2009) analyse the liquidity effect of unemployment
insurance and find a large impact on employment duration, but only a small impact
on subsequent wages. Wage gains are concentrated among workers at the bottom of
the pre-unemployment income distribution. Ehrenberg and Oaxaca (1976) find that an
increase in unemployment benefits results in productive job search for a subsample of
older workers, with positive outcomes on both wages and the duration of subsequent
employment. In contrast, the authors do not find any wage difference for the younger
cohort of workers, while it still increases the unemployment spell. Caliendo et al.
(2013) provide evidence that unemployed workers who find a job close to benefit
exhaustion (or shortly after) experience less stability in their subsequent employment
and receive lower wages compared to other unemployed workers with extended benefits
who exit employment at the same time. However, this result is only significant for
men. Wulfgramm and Fervers (2013) take furthermore active labour market policies into
account and find that unemployment benefits function as a search subsidy, and that
training programmes and counseling services lead to higher reemployment stability.
In contrast, Card et al. (2007), Lalive (2007), van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) and
Schmieder et al. (2010) do not find significant outcomes. Card et al. (2007) estimate
job search behaviour to cash-on-hands using Austrian data, and make use of sharp
discontinuities in the eligibility for severance pay and extended UI benefits. They
find that an increase in severance pay and an extension of UI benefit duration lead
to reduced job finding rates, but that an increase in search duration has little or no
effect on subsequent job match quality. Lalive (2007) equally uses Austrian data and
concludes, using a regression discontinuity design, that changes in benefit duration
do not affect the subsequent employment quality measured by wages. In their paper
van Ours and Vodopivec (2008) analyse how job quality is affected after a change in
Slovenia’s unemployment insurance law, but do not find significant effects on subsequent
wages, the probability to secure a permanent contract or employment duration. Finally,
Schmieder et al. (2010) analyse the impact of different unemployment insurance lengths
on labour supply and search outcomes using data from Germany, and equally do not
find any effect of increased UI duration on employment quality, expressed as subsequent
wages.
While extensive research has been conducted analysing the effect of unemployment
insurance on subsequent job quality, there is still a general lack of research with regard to
a possible impact of unemployment insurance savings accounts. However, the outcomes
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can widely differ, as unemployment accounts primarily present a forced savings scheme
compared to unemployment insurance based on risk-pooling. The only research in this
area so far conducted has analysed the impact of savings on search intensity in a job search
model with unemployment insurance (Lentz, 2009; Vejlin, 2011). Both articles find, using
Danish data, that wealthy individuals experience longer unemployment duration which
is explained by lower search intensity. While the case of Denmark analyses the impact of
wealth in a context of unemployment insurance provision, the case of Chile is described
as a forced savings scheme with monthly contributions into an individual savings account,
complemented by a solidarity pillar. Reyes et al. (2011) analyse the Chilean UISA scheme
and provide evidence that individuals internalise the cost of unemployment by reduced
moral hazard. Therefore, the impact of UISA introduction on subsequent wages, contract
types or employment stability continues to be unclear.
Finally, it is important to remark that labour market evaluations using emerging and
developing country data are still limited, as the bulk of research has so far been conducted
with advanced country data with a focus on North America and Europe. However, the
labour market functions differently in developing economies, for example due to a large
informal labour market, where unemployed workers could potentially find employment
during “official” unemployment spells.
3 The Chilean UISA Scheme
This section provides an overview of the Chilean UISA scheme, consisting of a description
of how unemployment protection was organised before the new policy introduction and
the historical and economic context of the new legislation. Furthermore it entails a
detailed description of the scheme and a summary of the changes affecting workers and
employers.
3.1 Context
Before the introduction of UISA, severance pay was the principal form of unemployment
protection in Chile for workers dismissed according to labour Code 161,7 complemented by
benefits financed by social security and additional minor support programmes.8 Severance
pay led to labour market rigidities, but offered limited protection to unemployed
workers, as only workers dismissed due to economic necessities or bankruptcy of the
firm received benefits during unemployment spells, often without the guarantee of
payout.9 The complementary unemployment benefits by the Social Security were minimal
7 Article 161 of the labour code. Dismissal due to company needs (economic reason or downsizing).
8 For each completed year of employment, workers were entitled to one month severance pay with a
maximum of eleven years.
9 Limited protection can result through restricted access to severance pay, as workers often face strict
regulations of severance pay eligibility, and may involve long judicial processes if firms try to evade
their payment obligations. Furthermore firms which are in financial distress or go bankrupt may be
unable to transfer the required amount to their previous employees (Acevedo et al., 2006).
6
and independent of previous salaries. Further support was provided through workfare
programmes for low-income workers, hiring subsidies for firms, unemployment insurance
for domestic helpers and job search assistance (Acevedo et al., 2006).10
The political and economic context of UISA introduction was based on two major events:
(i) the political change in 1990, when democracy was restored in Chile, and center and
left-wing parties formed a coalition giving priority to improving workers’ position, leading
to an extension in severance pay and (ii) the sharp increase in the unemployment rate
end of the 1990s due to a deterioration in terms of trade and external demand and the
negative impact of the Asian crisis, leaving many workers unemployed and without means
to smooth consumption (Acevedo et al., 2006).
The development and design of the new scheme involved various parties with different
concerns and interests. While the government intended to limit moral hazard, employers
were worried about labour market flexibility, and workers, represented by labour
unions, did not want to forfeit “hard won rights” as they considered the extension of
severance pay after the political change in Chile (Sehnbruch, 2004). With the expansion
in unemployment protection in terms of access and amount of benefits transferred,
while limiting moral hazard through individualised accounts (Reyes et al., 2011) and
moderately relaxing the severance pay ad-hoc obligations, the new unemployment policy
was approved 2001 in Congress with a high political consensus and implemented in
October 2002 (Acevedo et al., 2006).
3.2 Detailed Description
The new unemployment protection consists of two components: (i) individual savings
accounts for each worker as a form of self-insurance, backed up by (ii) a solidarity
fund (SF) that functions similarly to an unemployment insurance based on risk-pooling.
The scheme covers all private sector workers over 18 years, with either a temporary or
permanent contract. Enrollment into the new scheme is mandatory for all workers starting
a new employment contract after October 2002, avoiding adverse selection. Workers who
started a new employment before the introduction date can voluntarily switch to the new
system, but only very few decided to do so.11
The financing of UISA is regulated differently by contract type. For employees with a
permanent contract UISA contributions are financed by both employer and employee (2.4
percent and 0.6 percent, respectively), and are split between the individual account to
10 These additional support programmes were often uncoordinated and ineffective. For the workfare
programmes only minimum wages were paid, the discretionary design presented problems, and the
rushed implementation in times of crisis led to suboptimal programme design. The hiring subsidies
in times of high unemployment, in turn, were expensive (about USD 60 million), and abuse of the
programme was widely reported. Unemployment insurance for domestic helpers only covered this
small sector of domestic employees, and job search assistance was performed at the local level leading
to limited geographical coverage (Acevedo et al., 2006).
11 In my sample only 8 out of 3,384 workers who started a new employment during the two years before
UISA introduction are voluntarily affiliated to the new scheme, presenting below 0.5 percent of the
sample. Huneeus et al. (2012) report 2 percent voluntary affiliation by December 2010.
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save up for possible unemployment spells (2.2 percent) and the common SF (0.8 percent).
The latter is also co-financed by the government with approximately USD 16 million per
year (Huneeus et al., 2012).12 For employees with a temporary contract only the employer
contributes to the savings account with 3.0 percent and workers do not have access to
the SF.13
Benefits were considerably extended in terms of eligibility and total amount transferred.
Although the previously existing unemployment subsidy lasting for twelve months was
replaced by transfers lasting for a maximum of five months, the current support system
is more generous, translating into overall higher transfers. The accumulated benefits
in the individual accounts are transferred to workers terminating their employment for
any cause,14 conditional that they have worked for a certain minimum period of time:
six months for workers with temporary contracts, and twelve months for workers with
permanent contracts, continuous or discontinuous, since they became affiliated to the
scheme or since the last time they requested and were granted benefits (Huneeus et al.,
2012). Workers with permanent contracts who lose their employment according to Labour
Code 161 are equally better protected, as they have, apart from the severance pay and
their accumulated savings, access to the SF in case of low individual savings. In this case
access to the SF is optional, and if workers decide to receive these benefits they have
to accept additional conditions: (i) they have to pay monthly visits to the municipal
employment office, (ii) they must be willing to participate in training programmes and
(iii) they must accept job offers paying at least 50 percent of their pre-unemployment
wage (Reyes et al., 2011). Finally, workers who do not become unemployed during their
working life receive their accumulated account balance when retiring (Sehnbruch, 2004).
Table 1: Benefit Changes Before and After UISA Introduction
EVENT Before UISA After UISA
Job change Loss of accumulated rights to severance
pay
Loss of severance pay (as before), keeps
accumulated savings in UISA account
Unemployment Severance pay if job loss occurred due to
labour Code 161
All other cases: nothing
Severance pay (as before), transfer
of accumulated savings (maximum five
months), solidarity fund if applicable
Inactivity Severance pay if job loss occurred due to
labour Code 161
All other cases: nothing
Severance pay (as before), transfer
of accumulated savings (maximum five
months)
Retirement Nothing Transfer of accumulated savings given
account balance is positive
Death Nothing Transfer of accumulated savings given
account balance is positive to surviving
dependents
Note(s): By author based on Acevedo et al. (2006).
Table 1 summarises the changes in unemployment benefits before and after UISA
12 See also Figures 3 and 4 in Appendix A.
13 Since a reform in May 2009 workers with temporary contracts are also eligible to receive unemployment
benefits through the solidarity pillar. Huneeus et al. (2012) describe the 2009 reform in more detail.
14 Also in case of just cause, including the following events: expiration of contract, voluntary resignation
or misconduct.
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introduction. For all events (job change, unemployment, inactivity, retirement and death
of the worker) the current situation with UISA is more beneficial for the worker or his/her
dependents: for a change in employment, opportunity costs decreased, while in all other
cases accumulated savings are directly transferred to the worker or the dependents.
Since the UISA reform, severance pay continues to be paid out in case of dismissal due
to economic necessities of the firm with the possibility of deducting accumulated savings
from the severance pay liabilities. While it does not directly improve the situation of
employers, it alleviates the ad-hoc obligation of the firm when the severance pay is due.
4 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The database used in this paper is the Chilean EPS database,15 a longitudinal survey
with questions on the individual and household level about the Chilean labour market
and social protection system.16 The survey was conducted in 2002, 2004, 2006 and
2009 and contains retrospective data since January 1980. When the first round was
conducted in 2002, the sample was drawn from a frame of 8.1 million current and former
affiliates of the Chilean pension system included for at least one month in the time
frame 1980 to 2001 containing 17,246 individuals, 937 of them reported by surviving
relatives. The survey was extended in 2004 with non-affiliated individuals, completing
the base sample, and has since then been representative on the regional and national level
for the entire Chilean population. Since 2004 the data is linked to the administrative
records of the pension scheme, health insurance, the cash transfer programme “Chile
Solidario” and other welfare programmes. In 2004 new health and wealth questions
were added to the questionnaire. In 2006 and 2009 the sample was kept, and includes
approximately 16,000 individuals (15 years and older) of all regions.17 The EPS is the
first panel survey conducted in Chile with four rounds of data collection covering this
range of thematic areas. The questionnaires contain sections on labour history and social
security, education, health, social protection, labour training, property and patrimony,
family history and housing.18
For the analysis I select as the dependent variables the difference in average net wage
and contract type between the initial and subsequent employment relation, as the
main independent variable UISA affiliation, and as further covariates changes in labour
characteristics of private sector workers. Average net wage is expressed in 2002 prices19
and contract type is coded as permanent contract. Affiliation to the UISA scheme is
expressed as a binary variable, where I allocate UISA=1 to all workers who started a new
15 The acronym EPS stands for Encuesta de Proteccio´n Social in Spanish, or Social Protection Survey
in English (Subsecretar´ıa de Previsio´n Social Chile, 2009).
16 The survey is conducted by the Centre for Microdata, Department of Economics, of the University of
Chile (Centro Microdatos, Universidad de Chile) with the support of the University of Pennsylvania.
17 In each survey round three different types of questionnaires account for repeated, new and deceased
participants.
18 See also Nagler (2013).
19 Data from the International Monetary Fund: inflation of average consumer prices for Chile 2000-2010
(index and percentage change). Data last updated 03/2013.
Exchange rate on 28 July 2015: 663 CLP = 1 USD [www.xe.com].
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employment after the UISA introduction in October 2002 and UISA=0 to all workers
who started their employment before.20
Table 2 shows the initial and subsequent average net wage and contract type of formal
private sector workers who started a new employment during the two years before or
after the policy introduction. I take the subgroup of workers who directly changed
into a new employment after terminating this initial employment relation. The wage
difference is higher among the workers who started their initial employment before UISA
introduction compared to those who started during the two years after. The change
in the differences is negative for both men and women, and larger for men than for
women. A possible explanation could present the fact that a change of employment
included large opportunity costs before the policy introduction, motivating workers to
only change employment if new job conditions clearly improved. The wage outcome in
terms of gender is contradictory. Before UISA introduction the difference for women
is smaller compared to men, but larger afterwards. The differences in contract type
are minor, namely -2 percentage points for women before and 1 percentage point after,
and -4 percentage points for men before and 0 percentage point difference after UISA
introduction. The change in the differences is positive for both men and women, and
larger for men than for women.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics - Post-Employment
Before UISA After UISA
Wage Obs Initial Subs Diff Obs Initial Subs Diff Change
Female 206 143.60 160.19 16.59 164 152.04 166.59 14.55 -2.04
(110.74) (126.83) (90.48) (129.54)
Male 581 178.80 202.32 23.52 472 200.08 214.44 14.36 -9.16
(145.48) (167.19) (140.80) (169.78)
Contract Obs Initial Subs Diff Obs Initial Subs Diff Change
Female 241 0.62 0.60 -0.02 174 0.53 0.52 -0.01 0.01
(0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50)
Male 661 0.58 0.54 -0.04 486 0.49 0.49 0.00 0.04
(0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Note(s): Standard deviation in parenthesis. Differences in bold if difference is statistically significant
at the 5 percent level. Wage: average monthly net wage in 1,000’s of CLP (in 2002 prices). Contract:
binary variable; the variable takes the value 1 if the contract is permanent. Subs = subsequent wage or
contract type.
Further I tabulate the subsequent type of employment of workers who directly change
into a new employment before or after UISA introduction. For wages I have a sample of
766 before UISA and 647 after UISA. From the 766 workers before UISA introduction 81
percent remain in the private sector, 10 percent become self-employed, 3 percent change
into the public sector and the remaining observations can be found among employers and
domestic workers. 43 percent of the subsequent contracts are temporary and 57 percent
permanent. After UISA introduction the shares are similar. From the 647 workers 84
20 This binary variable is not a self-reported variable, nor does it include any information on benefit
collection. See also Nagler (2013).
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percent remain in the private sector, 11 percent become self-employed and 3 percent
change into the public sector. The difference in contract types is a bit larger, with 50
percent of the contracts being temporary and 50 percent permanent. Finally, I assert
that 30 percent of the observations are censored, identifying the workers who started a
new employment in the time period observed and continue to be in the same employment
at the time of the last survey.
Table 3 shows the initial and subsequent average net wage and contract type of private
sector workers who started a new employment during the two years before or after
the policy introduction. I take the subgroup of workers who experienced a period of
unemployment after terminating the initial employment relation, before re-entering the
labour market.21 While there is a positive difference in subsequent wages among the
workers who started their initial employment before UISA, it is slightly negative for
women afterwards. For men the wage level practically remains unchanged. In terms of
gender the difference for women is smaller compared to men before UISA introduction,
and negative afterwards. The differences in contract type are again minor, namely -1
percentage point for women before and 4 percentage points after, and 1 percentage point
for men before and 3 percentage points difference after UISA introduction.
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics - Post-Unemployment
Before UISA After UISA
Wage Obs Initial Subs Diff Obs Initial Subs Diff Change
Female 143 124.32 126.06 1.74 249 123.66 118.37 -5.29 -7.03
(68.26) (74.90) (65.83) (57.11)
Male 310 159.93 167.46 7.53 341 168.03 167.21 -0.82 -8.35
(100.93) (105.42) (116.08) (112.75)
Contract Obs Initial Subs Diff Obs Initial Subs Diff Change
Female 226 0.38 0.33 -0.05 255 0.20 0.23 0.03 0.08
(0.49) (0.47) (0.40) (0.42)
Male 456 0.42 0.40 -0.02 344 0.28 0.28 0.00 0.02
(0.49) (0.49) (0.45) (0.45)
Note(s): Standard errors in parenthesis. Differences in bold if difference is statistically significant at the
5 percent level. Wage: average monthly net wage in 1,000’s of CLP (in 2002 prices). Contract: binary
variable, the variable takes the value 1 if the contract is permanent. Subs = subsequent wage or contract
type.
Further I tabulate the subsequent type of employment of workers who experienced a
period of unemployment before re-entering the labour market before or after UISA
introduction. For wages I have a sample of 434 before UISA and 594 after UISA. From
the 434 workers before UISA introduction 87 percent remain in the private sector, 5
percent become self-employed, 5 percent change into the public sector and the remaining
observations can be found among employers and domestic workers. 59 percent of the
contracts are temporary and 41 percent are permanent. After UISA introduction the
shares of employment type are similar. From the 594 workers 89 percent remain in the
21 The period of unemployment is of different length and can include short-, medium- and longer-term
unemployment.
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private sector, 5 percent become self-employed and 2 percent change into the public sector.
The share of contract types, however, differs considerably. 74 percent of the contracts
are temporary and only 26 percent are permanent. Finally, I assert that 4 percent of the
observations are censored, identifying the workers that became unemployed and continue
to be unemployed at the time of the last survey.
The descriptive statistics report the average differences of the initial and subsequent
wages and contract types of workers who started their initial employment in the two years
before or after UISA introduction. They give a first indication of differences explained
by UISA affiliation in the two subgroups of workers that I study. Next, I conduct an
empirical analysis using econometric techniques to further analyse a possible impact of
UISA introduction on subsequent job quality.
5 Methodology
For the analysis I use a difference-in-differences approach and proceed in two steps. First
I estimate regressions with a sample of formal private sector workers only, where I use
the differences in wages and contract types from the initial and subsequent employment
relation as the dependent variables. As main explanatory variable I take UISA affiliation,
and as further explanatory variables changes in the workers’ characteristics. In these
regressions I therefore compare workers who started before with workers who started after
UISA introduction, analysing the differences in wages and contract types. Second, I use an
untreated comparison group. The difference-in-differences is then defined as a comparison
of two sample results studied before and after the introduction of a policy scheme or a
policy intervention, but where only one of the groups was exposed to treatment. In other
words, I analyse potentially significant differences in wages and contract types for two
different groups and for two different periods in time.
A simple example of a difference-in-differences approach would be,
yit = α + βDt + εit, i = 1, ..., N, t = 0, 1 (1)
where Dt = 1 after the policy was introduced and Dt = 0 before, and where yit measures
the outcome studied. The regression result, estimated using the sample data, yields β as
the measure of the policy impact.
However, this approach makes the assumption that the sample remains comparable over
the time period observed, assuming no other changes or time trends, that could actually
falsify β. One solution to improve the estimation is to include data from an untreated
comparison group. The regression then is,
yit = α + α1Dt + α
1Dj + βD
j
t + ε
t
it, i = 1, ..., N, t = 0, 1 (2)
where j is the group subscript, where Dj = 1 if j = 1 and Dj = 0 if j = 0, and where
Djt = 1 if both j and t are equal to 1, and D
j
t = 0 otherwise.
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For the treated sample the equation before the policy intervention is,
y1i0 = α + α
1D1 + ε1i0 (3)
and the equation after the policy intervention is,
y1i1 = α + α1 + α
1D1 + β + ε1i1 (4)
The impact can then be calculated as,
y1i1 − y1i0 = α1 + β + ε1i1 − ε1i0 (5)
The corresponding equations for the untreated sample are,
y0i0 = α + ε
0
i0 (6)
y0i1 = α + α1 + ε
0
i1 (7)
And where the difference can then be calculated as,
y0i1 − y0i0 = α1 + ε0i1 − ε0i0 (8)
The post-intervention specific effect α1 can be eliminated using the control sample by
taking the difference of the equations (5) and (8).
(y1i1 − y1i0) − (y1i1 − y1i0) = β + (ε1i1 − ε1i0) − (ε0i1 − ε0i0) (9)
The difference of the error terms is assumed to equal 0, and therefore it is possible to
estimate β by taking the sample average of (y1i1 − y1i0)− (y1i1 − y1i0), leading to the results
in a difference-in-differences estimate (Cameron and Trivedi, 2009).
In the first part of the analysis the two groups are represented by workers who started
their employment before or after the policy introduction, and are therefore distinguished
by UISA affiliation. In the second part, I take informal private sector workers as the
control group, defined as workers without a contract, who are not exposed to the new
unemployment protection scheme. The two different time periods are the month of the
initial employment and the month of the subsequent employment. In each point in time
I take the wage (log transformed) or contract type, and calculate the difference.
6 Results
The results are organised in three sections. In section 6.1 I analyse the data graphically to
identify a possible discontinuity in the differences of wages and contract types of workers
who started a new employment relation before or after UISA introduction. In section 6.2
I conduct an econometric analysis, where I use the methodology previously described.
Finally, I conduct a set of robustness tests in section 6.3.
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6.1 Graphical Analysis
The graphical analysis is the first step in the empirical analysis. The value of the outcome
is computed on both sides of the cutoff point, the UISA introduction date, to visually
analyse a possible difference in the differences of wages and contract types before and
after the policy was introduced. Assessing the graph gives a first evidence of a possible
jump in the mean of the differences. If the graphs do not show a jump at the cutoff point,
there is already a reduced chance that further analysis will lead to robust estimates with
a statistically significant and substantial differences for both groups of workers.
Figure 1 shows the differences in wages (log transformed) and contract types of the
initial compared to the subsequent employment relation of workers who started their
initial employment in the two years before or two years after UISA introduction, and
who directly changed into a new employment.22 The dots on the X-axis therefore
show the month of the initial employment start (24 months before and 24 months
after the introductory date), while the dots on the Y-axis show the differences in wages
(log transformed) and contract types between the initial and subsequent employment
relation.23
Figure 1a does not show a significant jump in the wages of workers around the policy
introduction, nor any significant changes over the time period analysed. The difference in
wages seems to be approximately stable and independent of UISA affiliation. In Figure
1b the picture is similar. The discontinuity is not very pronounced around the UISA
introduction, and only a small drop in the difference in contract types can be observed.
In both time periods the fitted linear lines show a small, but steady increase, implying an
overall small improvement in the contract type difference over the time period observed.
Figure 1: Wage and Contract Type Differences (Post-Employment)
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Figure 2 shows the differences in wages (log transformed) and contract types between
22 I do not take the length of the initial employment into account. It can last from one month to various
years.
23 For the contract type the value -1 represents a switch from permanent to temporary contract type, the
value +1 a switch from temporary to permanent contract type, and the value 0 represents no change:
either two temporary or two permanent subsequent contract types.
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the initial and the subsequent employment relation of workers who started their initial
employment in the two years before or after UISA introduction, and who started a new
employment after experiencing a period of unemployment.24 The dots on the X-axis
therefore show the month of the initial employment start (24 months before and 24
months after the introductory date), while the dots on the Y-axis show the differences in
wages and contract types between the initial and the subsequent employment relation.
Figure 2a shows again a very smooth level in the wage difference for workers who
experienced a period of unemployment, and no discontinuity can be observed around
the UISA introduction. In Figure 2b the discontinuity is small around the cutoff point,
but a difference can be observed in the slope over the time period observed. Before UISA
introduction the slope is positive and rising, afterwards the slope is largely stable.
Figure 2: Wage and Contract Type Differences (Post-Unemployment)
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In sum, I do not find indications for a sharp discontinuity in the differences of wages
or contract types for workers in both samples. The difference in wages is largely stable
over the time period observed, and the difference in contract types shows only a small
discontinuity around the cutoff point for both samples. To identify if these differences are
statistically significant, I estimate a set of regressions, accounting for the observational
type of data. In the following subsection I use a difference-in-differences methodology to
account for further aspects in the study of subsequent employment quality since UISA
affiliation of workers was not randomised.
6.2 Difference-in-Differences
For the econometric analysis I estimate a set of regressions. First, I analyse the sample
of formal private sector workers and use the differences in wages and contract types
between the initial and the subsequent employment relation as the dependent variables.
Second, I use a difference-in-differences methodology to account for time trends, where
I take informal private sector workers as the control group. I make the assumption that
24 I do not take the length of the initial employment, nor the length of the unemployment period into
account. Both can last from one month to various years.
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informal private sector workers experience similar trends in the labour market and are
therefore comparable to the formal private sector workers, with the difference that they
do not have a contract. Consequently these workers are not affiliated to the new UISA
scheme if they started a new work relation after October 2002, since their work relation
is informal, and are excluded from unemployment protection.
Table 4 shows the results for the sample of formal private sector workers using the
differences in wages (log transformed) and contract types as dependent variables. For
the change in contract type I estimate an ordered probit model. In the upper part of
the table, where (ln)wage change is the dependent variable, the results are not significant
for wages when taking only UISA affiliation as explanatory variable. However, with
additional covariates, the wage change is significant at the 5 or 10 percent level and
negative. In the regressions (2) and (5) I add a binary variable indicating if the workers
started the initial employment before UISA introduction and the subsequent employment
relation afterwards, since the wage of the subsequent employment is potentially affected
by the policy scheme. In the post-unemployment sample this binary variable is indeed
significant and negative. In the regressions (3) and (6) I also add the length of the initial
employment relation in months and the information if the worker changed the sector
for the subsequent employment relation.25 The variable “same sector” is significant and
positive, indicating that remaining in the private sector has a positive effect on the
wage difference compared to workers who find employment elsewhere. For the post-
unemployment sample I also add the length of unemployment duration, which is not
significant for the wage difference. Overall the results show that the wage difference is 5
to 6 percent lower for UISA affiliates in the post-employment sample, and 6 to 7 percent
lower in the post-unemployment sample.
In the lower part of the regression table, where the change in contract types is the
dependent variable, the coefficients for UISA affiliation are positive, but not significant in
all regressions. The binary variable D2 is significant for both samples with contradicting
effects (negative in regression (2), but positive in the regressions (3) and (6)), and previous
employment duration significant and negative. Remaining in the same sector is positive
at the 1 percent level for the post-employment sample, while unemployment duration has
no significant effect.
In summary the results indicate that UISA introduction had a significant and small
negative effect on the wage difference (of about 5 to 7 percent), but did not have an effect
on the difference in contract types. To further study the negative effect on the difference
in wage change, I take next a control group to account for labour market trends.
The results in Table 5 largely confirm the outcomes of the previous table. In the difference-
in-differences analysis with the control group I estimate wage growth only, since informal
private sector employees do not have a contract and a differentiation between permanent
and temporary contract is therefore not possible. The overall effect (marginal effect) of
UISA affiliation is again significant and negative for the wage difference. However, using
the control group, it is now furthermore possible to study if the difference in the differences
25 The variable “same sector” is equal to 1 if the worker remains in the private sector. The change of
sector can be into different types of employment relations: employer, self-employed, the public sector,
domestic worker, non-renumerated family worker or military service.
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Table 4: Before-After Regression Analysis (Without Control Group)
Post-Employment Post-Unemployment
∆ (ln)wage (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UISA -0.036 -0.047* -0.055** -0.025 -0.063** -0.065**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
D2 -0.043 -0.065 -0.105** -0.098*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Emp. Duration 0.002 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
Same Sector 0.159** 0.211***
(0.04) (0.06)
Unemp. Duration -0.002
(0.00)
Constant 0.068*** 0.079*** -0.108** 0.004 0.041 -0.091
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.07)
N 1,386 1,386 1,386 1,019 1,019 1,019
Post-Employment Post-Unemployment
∆ contract type (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
UISA 0.063 0.027 0.093 0.100 0.083 0.115
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
D2 -0.165* 0.322*** -0.071 0.321**
(0.09) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Emp. Duration -0.025*** -0.025***
(0.00) (0.01)
Same Sector 0.253*** 0.049
(0.09) (0.13)
Unemp. Duration -0.010
(0.01)
Cut 1 -1.009 -1.045 -1.037 -1.083 -1.100 -1.261
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15)
Cut 2 1.169 1.135 1.199 1.218 1.201 1.077
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14)
N 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,281 1,281 1,281
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual level. Coefficients are reported
in the ordered probit analysis. See Table 6 in Appendix B for marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05,
*** p < 0.01.
is significant when comparing the treatment group, formal private sector workers, to
this control group. The interaction term UISA x Formal suggests that the difference
in the differences of wages between treatment and control group is not significant for
the post-employment group, but positive and significant for the post-unemployment
group. While the difference in wages is overall negative, the difference in the differences
is positive. This outcome suggests that the UISA introduction only had a significant
effect on the wage difference for workers experiencing a period of unemployment before
re-entering the labour market, but that the effect on the post-employment group might be
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insignificant. The positive effect on the post-unemployment group further suggests that
UISA affiliation, and therefore financial benefits during unemployment, fulfills the goal of
allowing unemployment workers to be more selective while searching for new employment,
leading to an advantageous wage difference compared to the control group.
Table 5: Difference-in-Differences (With Control Group)
Post-Employment Post-Unemployment
∆ (ln)wage (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
UISA x Formal 0.069 0.070 0.058 0.147** 0.140** 0.140**
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
UISA -0.106** -0.117** -0.114** -0.172*** -0.200*** -0.203***
(0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.060) (0.061)
Formal -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.134*** -0.234*** -0.227*** -0.230***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
D2 -0.045 -0.067 -0.098** -0.092*
(0.040) (0.046) (0.042) (0.049)
Emp. Duration 0.002 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Same Sector 0.217*** 0.144***
(0.037) (0.054)
Unemp. Duration 0.000
(0.003)
Constant 0.202*** 0.213*** 0.023 0.238 0.118*** 0.144**
(0.036) (0.037) (0.048) (0.049) (0.034) (0.073)
- Marg. Effect
UISA
-0.036** -0.047** -0.056** -0.025*** -0.060*** -0.063***
- Marg. Effect
Formal
-0.064*** -0.064*** -0.075*** -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.090***
Wald Test UISA 0.043 0.021 0.012 0.009 0.001 0.001
Wald Test Formal 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 1,902 1,902 1,902 1,331 1,331 1,331
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at the individual level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, ***
p < 0.01.
Summarising the econometric analysis I find only significant effects for the difference in
wages, which are negative for both groups. Taking informal private sector workers as
control group, I find that the difference-in-differences is only significant for the post-
unemployment sample, and positive. Since the effect on the wage difference is negative,
three explanations are at hands. First, the cost of the new unemployment protection
was passed on to the workers’ wages by their employers. While the subsequent wage
is higher for post-employment workers with and without UISA affiliation, the difference
is smaller for UISA affiliates. In the post-unemployment group the subsequent wage is
even lower than the initial wage for UISA affiliates. Second, workers affiliated to the
UISA scheme might give less importance to an equal or higher wage in the subsequent
employment compared to workers without unemployment protection. They are more
willing to leave their current employment relation and change into another job, even if
wages are similar or below their initial employment wage (see also Nagler, 2013). Third,
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workers experiencing a period of unemployment might take more time to find a new
job due to unemployment protection. While this gives unemployed workers more leeway
to find a job with adequate conditions, it could equally lead to skills depreciation and
constitute the dominant effect in this case. Workers who are longer unemployed might face
inferior conditions when re-entering the labour market. This last hypothesis, however,
casts doubts, since the regressions in Tables 4 and 5 do not indicate a significant negative
effect of unemployment duration on wage growth.
6.3 Robustness
To test the robustness of my previous estimates I conduct two falsification tests and
furthermore estimate additional regressions using, adding the UISA amount to net
wages.26 In the first falsification test I change the introduction date “as if” the UISA
scheme had been introduced two years later, in October 2004. In the second falsification
test I estimate the same set of regressions for the difference-in-differences analysis using
public sector employees as an alternative control group. In the additional regressions I
add the UISA amount to net wages of UISA affiliates to test if the costs of the protection
scheme have been deducted from the wages, presenting a delayed payment.
The first robustness test takes an alternative introduction date for UISA affiliation, “as if”
the unemployment insurance had been introduced two years later. I choose the alternative
introduction date of two years, since the sample for the analysis is taken from all formal
private sector employees who started two years before or two years after the official
UISA introductory date. Therefore the alternative sample only includes workers who
are affiliated to UISA, and where no official introductory date in between could falsify
the differences in wages or contract types. For the wage difference the results show
that the “as if” UISA variable is not significant in all regressions. For the difference
in contract types, the UISA variable is significant at the 5 percent level and positive in
the simple regression for the post-employment sample, but no longer significant when
adding covariates. The results for the UISA variable are all insignificant for the post-
unemployment sample. I therefore conclude that the results in the analysis with the
official introduction date, showing significant results for the wage change of UISA affiliates
and insignificant results for the change in contract types, can be considered valid.
The second robustness test takes a different control group for the difference-in-differences
estimations. The drawback of this alternative control group is the relatively small sample
size. Therefore the larger group of informal private sector employees were previously
selected for a more comprehensive analysis.27 However, it has the advantage of allowing
to include the difference in contract types. A permanent contract is more prevalent
among public sector employees, with a difference of approximately 10 percentage points
in both samples. I concentrate on the simple regressions and the regressions including
26 I also examine the economic cycle in Chile during the time period studied and summarise the results in
Appendix C. Overall Chile showed a stable economic performance, leading to limited concerns about
the impact of external factors that could influence the results of this paper.
27 The sizes of the control groups are: 84 (wages, post-employment), 105 (wages, post-unemployment),
61 (contract type, post-employment), 70 (contract type, post-unemployment).
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the D2 variable for this robustness test, where the only covariate is UISA affiliation for
the former, and UISA affiliation plus the D2 variable for the latter. The results of the
difference-in-differences analysis show that the differences between the treatment and
control group are not statistically significant for all regressions. UISA affiliation is not
significant in any of the simple regressions and equally insignificant for the regressions
including the D2 variable, with the exception of the difference in contract types for the
post-employment sample, where UISA affiliation is significant at the 10 percent level and
positive. Therefore I cannot identify a difference in the differences of wages or contract
types using this alternate control group. However, these results could be also caused by
the small sample size of public sector employees.28
Finally, I add the UISA amount that is paid by the employer (2.2 percent for a permanent
contract and 3.0 percent for a temporary contract) to net wages. In the regressions of
the post-employment sample, the UISA variable is significant at the 1 percent level and
positive, but wage growth very small with a 0.4 percent increase compared to non-UISA
affiliates. In the post-unemployment sample, UISA is significant at the 1 or 5 percent
level and positive, but the wage growth with a 0.1 percent increase even smaller compared
to non-UISA affiliates.
Summarising the analysis after conducting the two falsification tests and the additional
regressions, the first falsification test (using the alternative “as if” introductory date)
shows that the alternative UISA variable does not have a significant effect on the wage
difference. It only has a significant effect on the simple regression for the difference
in contract types for the post-employment sample. It therefore shows that the UISA
variable using the “as if” UISA introductory date largely reports no significant results,
strengthening the outcomes of the econometric analysis. Using the different control
group the results show that the differences between treatment and control group are
not statistically significant. While this outcome does not support the findings in the
econometric analysis, it needs to be interpreted with care, since the control group is
relatively small. Finally, running the additional regressions including the UISA amount
to net wages shows that the difference for UISA affiliates is significant and positive, but
very small. If the UISA amount is taken as a delayed payment and added to net wages,
then UISA have a small positive effect on subsequent employment quality measured by
wages.
7 Conclusion
This paper analyses whether the introduction of UISA in Chile had an impact on the
differences in wages and contract types of (i) workers directly changing into a new
employment, and (ii) workers experiencing a period of unemployment before re-entering
the labour market. Based on the results, I find evidence that the introduction of the
UISA scheme had a small negative effect on the wage difference, a small positive effect
on the difference in the differences compared to a control group, and no effect on the
28 I do not report the regression tables for both falsification tests in the paper, they are available upon
request.
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difference in contract types. In the remaining section I first summarise the empirical
results, before discussing policy implications and proposing areas of future research.
Summarising the results of the econometric analysis, I find evidence that the wage
difference was negatively affected by the UISA introduction, but that the new
unemployment insurance had no effect on the difference in contract types. With regard
to wage growth I find that the difference is between 5 to 7 percent lower compared to
workers who are not affiliated to the UISA scheme. Apart from the cost of UISA affiliation
that might be passed on to the employees’ wages, two other explanations are possible:
that employees with UISA affiliation put less emphasis on their subsequent wage, since
they face lower opportunity costs when changing employment. And that workers with
UISA affiliation who experienced a period of unemployment take more time to re-enter
the labour market and suffer from declining skills and other negative effects of longer
unemployment duration. In the empirical analysis, however, I do not find evidence that
unemployment duration had a significant effect on wage difference. Using a control group,
the results show that the difference-in-differences in wage growth is significant and positive
for the post-unemployment sample, suggesting that the unemployment protection allowed
unemployed workers to search for a new employment with more favourable conditions.
Testing the robustness of these results, I find the following. The first falsification test,
taking another date “as if” the UISA scheme had been introduced two years later,
supports the results. The outcomes of this artificial UISA variable are not significant for
wage growth and, in their majority, not significant for the difference in contract types. The
second test does not show any statistically significant difference between treatment and
control group, suggesting that the difference in wages could also be explained by labour
market trends of the Chilean economy. However, this outcome must be interpreted with
care, since the sample size of the alternative control group is small. Finally, adding the
UISA amount to net wages shows that wage growth is significant and positive, but that
the difference is very small and amounts to less than 1 percent.
These findings may be explained by the nature of the UISA scheme. The scheme is in fact
not an insurance, but a forced savings scheme. Employers and employees contribute with
a share of the monthly gross wage to an individual savings account from which transfers
are withdrawn in case of unemployment. In the case of wages, costs can easily be shifted
onto the employees’ wages, since they will eventually have access to the accumulated
savings. The point in time when they can access the money, has simply changed and
is now delayed. In the case of contract types the introduction is of limited importance,
since the costs are similar for temporary and permanent contracts. For workers changing
directly into a new employment, the new scheme presents reduced opportunity costs for
UISA affiliates. For workers experiencing a period of unemployment, UISA affiliates have
access to their accounts, but since savings are individualised and belong to the worker, the
motivation to extend the job search to find better jobs is limited (see also Reyes et al.,
2011). Furthermore the savings amount is rather small and can only provide partial
consumption smoothing during unemployment. Only for workers who have access to the
solidarity fund, the job search period was found to be significantly longer (Huneeus et al.,
2012).
The policy implications depend on the goals of the Chilean government with regard to
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this new unemployment insurance. While the literature provides inconsistent results
of subsequent employment quality for unemployment insurance schemes based on risk-
pooling, a number of studies do find positive effects on subsequent wages, contract
types and employment stability. If the Chilean government aims to improve subsequent
job quality, the insurance component of the scheme (the solidarity fund) might need
to be extended to provide better and more generous protection to workers, since the
contributions to the individual accounts can simply be deducted from the workers’ wages.
However, this goal might still not be achieved as outcomes are controversial (as shown in
the literature review), and furthermore stand in contrast to the other goals of the scheme,
such as the intended avoidance of moral hazard and financial sustainability.
Research on the impact of unemployment insurance savings accounts on labour market
outcomes is still limited. To the best of my knowledge, this paper provides for the first
time an evaluation of the impact of this type of unemployment protection on subsequent
employment quality. This type of analysis is also conducted for the first time using data
from an emerging economy. labour market research continues to be largely concentrated
on advanced economies and well-known social protection schemes. More research is
needed to evaluate policies and schemes that are not only different to the schemes found
in advanced economies, but that also face a diverging labour market context, for example
a large informal economy.
With regard to the impact of the Chilean UISA on subsequent employment quality more
research is recommended on differentiating the analysis by unemployed workers with and
without access to the solidarity fund to investigate the impact of the insurance component.
Furthermore I suggest studying the impact on subsequent employment duration, another
indicator for job quality, and the impact of a change in the policy scheme that was
introduced in 2009. Another aspect involves the unemployment duration for workers who
experience a period of unemployment before re-entering the work force, as unemployment
leads to skills depreciation of workers, and different lengths of unemployment spells can
therefore be expected to have a different impact on subsequent job quality. Finally,
employment quality can be defined by further variables, as mentioned in footnote 3,
for example more adequate matching of job requirements and worker’s qualifications,
distance to travel to the work place, or development opportunities within the company.
Since these aspects are more challenging to study using quantitative methods, further
research could also entail a qualitative research approach. Due to the importance of
labour income, and given limited social protection and underdeveloped financial markets
in developing countries, further research is highly recommended.
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A Overview UISA Scheme
Figure 3: Permanent Contract
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Note(s): Berstein et al. (2012).
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B Ordered Probit Model
Table 6: Marginal Effects
Post-Employment Post-Unemployment
∆ contract type (-1) (0) (+1) (-1) (0) (+1)
UISA -0.021 0.002 0.019 -0.024 0.001 0.023
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
D2 -0.073*** 0.007 0.065*** -0.066** 0.002 0.064**
(0.03) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Emp. Duration 0.006*** -0.001* -0.005*** 0.005*** -0.000 -0.005***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Same Sector -0.057*** 0.006 0.051*** -0.010 -0.000 0.010
(0.02) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.00) (0.03)
Unemp. Duration 0.002 -0.000 -0.002
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N 1,562 1,562 1,562 1,281 1,281 1,281
Note(s): Standard errors in parentheses and clustered at the individual level. Marginal Effects are
calculated for the models (3) and (6) of Table 4 and report the marginal effects for the three possible
scenarios of contract type differences. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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C Economic Cycle Chile
During the time frame studied in this paper, approximately the period from 2000 to 2009, Chile showed a
stable economic performance.29 The country achieved macroeconomic stability and its per-capita income
tripled by the end of the decade compared to 1990. Furthermore the poverty-rate was cut by two-thirds
through a reduction in economic vulnerabilities due to pro-poor policies (Simanovska and So¨derling,
2008). After a cyclical slowdown from 1998 to 2003, growth has reinitialised since 2003 due to strong
policy settings (OECD, 2007). The unemployment rate was approximately stable in the time period
from which the sample is drawn, and only decreased in the years 2006 to 2008, before it increased again
due to the world economic crisis. The business cycle was more volatile in 2000 and 2001, but has shown
a reduced volatility since 2002, with a smaller peak in 2005.
Even though the overall performance was rather stable in the decade from 2000 to 2010, the increased
economic growth after 2003 could still have affected wages and contract types due to the importance
of the macroeconomic environment on labour market outcomes. However, during the time the sample
is selected, the unemployment rate was stable. During the two years before UISA introduction, the
unemployment rate ranged from 9.5 to 10.2 percent (average: 9.9 percent) and during the two years
after from 9.2 to 10.5 percent (average: 9.8 percent).
Table 7 provides a detailed overview of basic macroeconomic indicators describing the Chilean economic
cycle, Figure 5 shows the volatility of the business cycle from 2000 to 2007, and Figure 6 the
unemployment rate from 2000 to 2010.
Table 7: Basic Macroeconomic Indicators - Overview
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
GDP Growth Rate (real, in %) 3.4 2.2 4.0 6.0 5.7 4.0
Nom. Budget Balance (in % of GDP) -0.5 -1.2 -0.4 2.1 4.7 7.9
Current Account Balance (in % of GDP) -1.6 -0.9 -1.1 2.2 1.1 3.6
Exchange Rate (CLP per USD, period avg) 634.9 688.9 691.4 609.5 559.8 530.3
CPI Inflation (IPC, in %, end of period) 2.6 2.8 1.1 2.4 3.7 2.6
Unemployment Rate (in %) 9.9 9.8 9.5 10.0 9.2 7.8
Note(s): OECD (2007), OECD Economic Surveys Chile (based on: Central Bank of Chile, Instituto
Nacional de Estad´ısticas and Ministry of Finance).
29 Time period studied: two years before UISA introduction in October 2002 until the last survey round
was conducted in 2009.
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Figure 5: Business Cycle
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Note(s): OECD (2007), OECD Economic Surveys Chile (based on: Ministry of Finance, Central Bank
of Chile and OECD calculations). Business cycle volatility is defined as the 12-months moving average
of the standard deviation (calculated over 12-months) of the output gap, defined as the percent
difference between the seasonally adjusted IMACEC index (monthly indicator of economic activity)
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